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AGNOSTICISM: KANT
CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter identifies the results of Kant's philosophical system on the
contemporary discussion concerning an inerrant revelation. Knowledge, for Kant, is possible only as the forms and categories of the mind
organize the raw data of the senses. Beyond this phenomenal world, the
mind can only postulate what must or ought to be. It cannot know what
is. The first postulate of this practical reasoning is freedom. The individual is autonomous, knows the good, and is capable of willing and
doing as he ought.
Within such an epistemological framework, revelation becomes unnecessary, useless, and unverifiable. Inerrancy is not only false but
incomprehensible in such a system. Since Kant's theory of knowledge
largely dominates contemporary theology, it is inevitable that inerrancy cannot be seen as an option.

THERE IS FAIR agreement among historians of thought
that Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) must be regarded not only as
the great creative genius of the modern period but also as one of
the most important framers of the contemporary mind. His
significant contributions to epistemology have secured him wide
fame, while his influence on the development of theology has
been unparalleled.
Part of Kant's greatness lies in the fact that he was able to
synthesize the two dominant but conflicting modes of thought of
the Enlightenment, empiricism and rationalism, into an integrated whole. That, however, should not blind us to the originality of his thought, in which the other part of his greatness is to
be found. This two-sidedness-a synthesizer, yet originalforces us to study Kant against the background of his historical
and cultural setting. He is as much a culmination of preceding
thought as he is a foundation for what was to follow.
Having said all of this, I must hasten to add that Kant's
influence has not been regarded as salutary in all corners, especially among evangelical theologians. A few examples will
suffice. John Gerstner states that it was Kant who began "the
philosophic revolt against reason which for contemporary man
has made any sort of rational apologetic impossible."l Clark
Pinnock, in a similar vein, refers to Kant's "repudiation of ra-
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tional religion,"2 the result of which has been that "the objectivity and rationality of divine revelation have been philosophically
questioned."3 Francis Schaeffer claims that "with his work, the
hope ofa unified knowledge was on the threshold of splitting into
two parts, neither having a relationship with the other."4
Schaeffer is referring here to the isolation of metaphysics, and
with it religion, from factual knowledge. This split, and the
placing of religion in the realm of the postulated but not known, is
for Schaeffer the source of contemporary "autonomous" mans
who determines for himself the God in whom he will believe.
As these quotes might indicate, most theologians have focused
on Kant's epistemology. In this essay, therefore we will spend
some time developing this foundation of his thought and will
return to it in the closing critique. However, most of the essay
focuses on Kant's views on revelational religion, as he presents
them in Religion Within the Limits if Reason Alone (1793).
This study is divided into four sections. The first is a brief
history of Kant's life. Second, we look at the basic structure of
Kant's system, in particular the possibility of knowledge. We
turn then to the question of religious knowledge and the implications of his epistemology for revelation. The concluding section
presents critical remarks and shows the importance of Kant's
influence on contemporary theology.
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1705). His mantle fell on his student August Franke. The key to
Pietism was its concentration on experience, including an insistence on a clear, sometimes exaggerated, conversion experience.
Pietism also emphasized the practical rather than dogmatic use
of Scripture-that is, the purpose of Scripture is to nourish and
sanctity. Many commentators have stressed the negative results
of this view of Scripture-particularly on Kant-but that ought
not to blind us to the positive aspects of this renewal movement.
German historians trace the beginnings of social programs for
the needy, including orphanages and missions, to Spener and
Franke. There is no doubt that Pietism also brought about a
concern for a disciplined and separated life on the part of the
believer.
At the Collegium Fredericianum this concern developed into a
regimented, regulated routine that impressed Kant as being
superficial and led to his total-and lifelong-rejection of religious practice in general. Though Kant retained a permanent
respect for Pietism, he consistently refused to attend church or
take part in any sort of church activity.
At age sixteen Kant became a student in the faculty of theology at the University of Konigsberg. Here he encountered the
second major theological influence that molded his philosophy:
Wolffian rationalism. Though Konigsberg had previously been
staunchly Pietistic, it had, in the decade before Kant began his
studies, come under the influence of English "free thinkers" and
deists and especially that of Christian Wolfrs (1679-1754)
theological development of Leibniz.
Whereas Pietism stressed revelation and the experiential,
Wolff looked to the rational and metaphysical. He held that
reason is capable of developing the doctrines of Christianity
without the assistance of, though perhaps at the instigation of,
revelation. Wolff deduced, with geometric precision, a complete
theology beginning from the ontological argument for God's
existence. 6
Kant learned most of his philosophy during these years from
Martin Knutzen, a Wolffian, though a favorite pupil of the
Pietist Schultz. Knutzen introduced Kant to the broad scope of
his knowledge from mathematics to astronomy, but particularly
physics. Kant's earliest writings were in physics, including his
dissertation in 1755, and he remained interested in the work of
Newton throughout his life.

A BRIEF HISTORY
Most of Kant's biographers have noted-sometimes to the
point of exaggeration-that his life was singularly uneventful.
Certainly in comparison to many other philosophers Kant had a
rather ordinary life. On the other hand, the productivity of his
last twenty years is extraordinary to say the least. But let us start
at the beginning.
Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in Konigsberg. His father
was a saddler and quite poor; his grandfather was an emigrant
from Scotland. Konigsberg, and with it Kant's family, had felt
the influence of the Pietist movement. Without doubt, the Pietist
renewal within the Lutheran church was a major influence in
Kant's life, particularly in the person of Franz A. Schultz, the
family's pastor. The young Kant attended the Pietist Collegium
Fredericianum from 1732 to 1740. Schultz became the director
there the year after Kant entered.
Pietism had been founded by Philipp Jakob Spener (1635-
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KANT'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

During the eight years between the completion of his studies at
Konigsberg and the dissertation, Kant earned a meager living as
a family tutor. For the fifteen years that followed, Kant was
unsuccessful in securing a professorial appointment at the university. He was forced to remain in relative poverty as a private
lectur~r, despite the fact that he quickly gained a reputation as a
brilliant teacher and attracted students from far beyond
Konigsberg.
In this period, from 1755 to 1770, Kant was strongly
influenced by Roussea.u and Hume. The former gave Kant the
importance of the concept of freedom; the latter awakened him
from his "dogmatic slumbers" as Kant himself put it. The Kant
who emerged from these years had shed his Wolffian rationalism
and come to grips with empirical skepticism at the other extreme.
Having rejected appointments at two renowned universities,
Kant was finally offered the chair of logic and metaphysics at
Konigsberg in 1770, a position he held until poor health forced
him to retire in 1797. He died in 1804.
The years following 1770 were marked by unbelievable productivity. During the first ten years he carefully worked out his
system. In 1781 his chief work, The Critique of Pure Reason,
appeared. Prolegomena to A'!)' Future Metaphysic was published in
1783, followed by Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic if Morals
in 1785 and Metaphysical First Principles if Natural Science the following year. In 1788 Kant published the second great critique,
The Critique if Practical Reason, and in 1790 the third, The Critique
if Judgment. The last of the great works of this period, and the
main source for this discussion, is his Religion Within the Limits if
Reason Alone, published in 1793.
This last-named work, Religion Within the Limits if Reason Alone,
precipitated the only real "event" of Kant's life. In 1786 Frederick William II had ascended the Prussian throne. His officials
imposed rather stringent censorship on religious publications.
The first section of the Religion passed without much problem.
The other sections were not approved at Konigsberg; Kant was
forced to gain the imprimatur from the faculty at Jena. Outraged, the king demanded that Kant no longer publish on matters of religion, a demand to which Kant assented, though the
Religion itself was frequently published and revised in following
years.

~ant's epistemolog~ begins with the rejection of the two major

Op~lOr:S. that faced hIm: Humean empiricism and Wolffian-

LeIbmzIan rationalism. Nevertheless, Kant does make use of
manr: of the insi~hts of each. With Hume he agrees that knowledge ~s of se~satlOns, but with Leibniz he recognizes that knowledge IS possIble only when the mind determines the nature of its
data.
The problem in Hume is that limitation of the mind to the
passive reception of impressions makes knowledge impossible.
Kant .argued that if Hume were correct, there could never be
anythI~!? beyond the irr:pressions. Knowledge presupposes the
re~ogmtlOn and companson of causal, spatial, and temporal relatlons, and much more. None of this, however, is provided by
the senses. ~hey give us only tastes, odors, color patches, and so
on. If there IS knowledge, and Kant never doubted that there is
then Hume must be wrong.
'
We s~oul~ note h:r: Kant's method for philosophy. He does
not begm .wIth defin~tIOns, as did Wolff, nor does he attempt a
psychologIcal analYSIS of knowledge, as did Locke and Hume.
Rather, Kant asks for the logical prerequisites of what we know
to be the case. There ~s knowledge. How then is it possible? What
must be the case for It to occur? This is the "critical" or "transcer:dental" method, the first method designed specifically for
phIlosophy.
How .t~en is knowledge possible? Kant begins the introduction to
The Crztzque if Pure Reason with the following statement:
There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience .... In the or~er of time, therefore, we have no knowledge
ant7cedent to expenence, and with experience all our knowledge
begms. 7

Kant accepts, then, the vie:w of the empiricists regarding the
senses: The senses are paSSIve receptors of isolated and atomic
sensatIOns-sounds, c~lor patches, and so forth. They are also
th~ only means by whIch any content can be provided for our
mmds to process. 8
Kant is equally adan:ant, however, that sensation by itself
cannot be knowledge. WIthout the operations of the mind there
~an ~e no det~rmination of the data. The impressions do not
IdentIfy, coordmate, or categorize themselves. We do not neces-
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sarily know what we are seeing when the mechanism of the
retina registers light impulses. Knowledge begins with sensation
but it does not end there. Kant himself puts it this way;
"Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."9
Just what is it that the mind adds to the sensations so that
knowledge results? First, the sensations are always sensed, and
can be sensed, only within the structures of time and space. If the
impressions were not put in sequence, arranged in relationship
to each other, and determined in size, extension, and so on,
we could not know at all. Since time and space are not actual
impressions yet are presupposed by the possibility of knowing,
they must beforms of intuition for the mind. They are not part of
the data, but are rather the ways in which our minds conceive
the data.
There is, further, a "transcendental logic," that is, the necessary categories whereby the mind judges the nature of sensations
in respect to their quantity, quality, relations (this includes, for
example, causal dependence), and modality. Together, the forms
and the categories are the filters that give order and determination to the data of the senses.
Knowledge, then, is the mind's conceptualization of the data.
When there is no sensory input, there can be no knowledge. As
~e ~hall see, t~e initial conclusion of Kant's epistemology is
sIgmficant for hIS treatment of revelation.
. Kant is convinced, however, that there is another type of
Judgment that we can make. The judgments that we make regarding the contingent data of the senses are, to use Kant's term
a posteriori. But, Kant asks in the Critique, how and in which
di~ciplines is it ~ossible to make judgments that are necessary and
unzversal? S~ch Judgments would have to be a priori, that is,
before and mdependent of the sensory data. The judgments that
we make on the basis of the senses could never meet the criteria.
They ca~not be univer~al since no one could ever observe every
possIble Instance of a Judgment. The geometric judgment that
the. shortest distance between two points is a straight lineumversally-cannot be known from observation. Perhaps it will
turn out differently the next time! Likewise, our observations
cannot establish the necessity of any judgment. The senses, says
Kant, can. only tell us what is, in fact, the case. They cannot
support a Judgment about what necessarily is the case.
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In fact, we have already come across the source of universal
and necessary judgments. The forms of intuition (time and
space). and the categories are concepts that govern every possible
sensatIon and thus meet the criteria. Kant considers these to be
the foundations of mathematics and the sciences. These disciplines are thus firmly based. Their principles are known as universal and necessary truths.
Is there metaphysical knowledge? We can now ask if, and how it is
possible for an individual to know anything about the ulti:nate
nature of reality-the existence and nature of God the condition
and destiny of man, the status and source of values' and so on. At
this point it is important to restate the essential' conclusion of
Kant's epistemology: While sensation provides the data of
knowledge, i~ is the mind tha~ actually makes the knowing possi~le b~, formmg an? categonzing. Furthermo;e, it is only the
pure understandIng of the concepts of the mInd that is universal and necessary.
Kant argues that there can be no knowledge of metaphysics
be.cause an atte~pt at such knowledge takes the concepts of the
mInd beyond theIr proper use. In the section of the Critique titled
"The Antinomies of Pure Reason," Kant claims to demonstrate
that when reason is applied to the ultimate that is the absolute
or infinite, a curious fact ensues: both sides ~fa con;radiction can
be proved. The best known of Kant's four examples is the third
antinomy. He states it this way:
Theszs: Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only
causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all
be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume
that there is also another causality, that of freedom.
Antithesis: There is no freedom; everything in the world takes
place solely in accordance with the laws of nature. 10

Kant takes the antinomies to be proof that our rational
abilities are meant to function only in relation to the realm of
sensible data. We cannot know reality in itself. We know only the
appearanc~s,. not what is re~lly out there. We cannot get beyond
our agnOStICIsm by extendIng the use of the categories to the
metaphysical realm of freedom, God, and values; nor can we
ever have direct acquaintance with the objects of our world. The
possibilities of knowing are limited by the forms of intuition and
the categories of judgment in their proper function.
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Kant's discussion, however, does not end here. While it is true
that we have exhausted the realm of pure reason and knowledge
proper, Kant discovers a second use of reason. Reas.on in relation
to experience can find only purely causal relatIOns between
physical objects. Neverthele~s, reason kn~ws that there must be
an initiation of causal chams by the wIll. Knowledge of the
"phenomena," to use Kant's term for the appearances ~s
ordered by the mind, could never include the freedom of the wIll
as an agent of events. Yet the chain of natural ~aus.es cannot ~e
thought of as going back infinitely. For no lmk m the cham
provides a complete ("sufficient"ll) explanation. There must be
··
.
an a b soIute b egmnmg,
a "pnme
mover. "12
There can be only one solution to the third antinomy. Freedom is not part of the phenomenal world but of the unknowable
"noumenal" world-the world as it really is, not as it appears to
us to be. Freedom must be the case, but we do not know it. This
precisely is the second use of reason, name~y, in r~lation to w~at
ought to be, n?t what ~s. Kant refe:s t~, th.lS. fun~~IOn as tractzcal
reason, the subject of hIS second major cntIque. P:actlcal reason is to be identified as will in its intellectual functIOn of determining action.
.
Thus, in the Critique if Pure Reason Kant ha~ determmed the
possibility of freedom and the noumenal. .But thIS, of course, do~s
not give us actual evidence for the realIty of freedom. For thIS
step there must be experience.
In the case offreedom there can be no empirical evidence. The
data of the senses give us no clue. We experience desires, emotions, and feelings; but these could all exist wi.thout the freedom
to fulfill them. Kant holds that there is expenence of the moral
law. It is at this point that we turn to the Critique if Practical
Reason.
The moral law shows its reality, in a manner which is sufficient
even from the point of view of the critzque of theoretical reason, in
adding a positive characteristic to a causalit.y.,:hich so ~ar has
been conceived only negatively and the posslbIlIty of whIch, although incomprehensible to theoretical reason, had ye~ to be assumed by it. This positive characteristic is the conceptIOn of.r~a
son as immediately determining the will (through the condItIOn
that a universal form can be given to its maxims as laws). Thus,
for the first time, the moral law can give objective (though only
practical) reality to reason which always hitherto had to tran-
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scend all possible experience when it put its ideas to a theoretical
use .... 13

For Kant this experience is unassailable. The conclusion of the
Critique if Practical Reason begins with the oft-quoted st~temen~ of
the two things that "fill the mind with ever new and mcreasmg
admiration and awe ... : the starry heavens above and the moral
law within."14 The moral law is apprehended as a sense of duty.
Duty, in turn, implies an obligation that is necessary (i~ does n~t
depend on how any individual infact ~~haves) ~nd .umvers~l (~;
applies to all human beings). It has a categoncallmp~rat1Ve,
to use Kant's term. That is, maxims or principles of actIOn confront me as applications of a moral law.
Kant concludes that there can be only one possibility for a
moral law that is necessary and universal and therefore unconditional. The categorical imperative is: "Act only according to that
maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law." 15
From this position we can derive all the great ideas of
metaphysics: freedom, immortality, and GOd. 16 Freedom is, .for
Kant the immediate postulate of the moral law. The very notion
of a ~oral duty is senseless unless I am free to perform it. The
concepts clearly imply each other. Without freedom there could
be no moral law. Apart from the moral law I would not know
that I was free.
Again, as a reminder, we are not dealing with the realm of
knowledge. Freedom is a postulate of practical reason, n~t an
item of knowledge of pure reason. 17 Moreover, freedom IS an
immediate postulate. My apprehension of duty is senseless without it.
The second postulate of Kant's ethical religion is immortality.
This postulate follows, Kant says, from the necessi~y of the m~ral
law and the principle that what is in fact a duty IS also achIevable. 1s The moral law demands perfect holiness. This is possible
only with infinite progress. Thus the soul must be immortal in
order to achieve this perfection.
The third postulate is the existence of God. In the first Critique
Kant had argued that pure reason is incapable of establishing
any argument for God's existence. 19 Thus the existence of God
cannot be known, but it can be postulated. This is, however, the
weakest even of the postulates; it is third in line. Practical reason
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must assume that happiness is coincident with obedience to the
moral law. Happiness, however, is the con~ition of man in the
world, that is, the causal world. But a person IS not able to ensure
such harmony of the noumenal will and the phenomenal.wor~d.
Thus, if perfection is attainable, then there must be .an mfimte
God who harmonizes morality and nature and ushers m the final
state of perfect existence. Christian doctrine refers to this state as
the kingdom.
.
In this way practical reason gives us no.t ?nly the IIl:am el~
ments of metaphysics but also leads to relIgIOn: an ethzcal relIgion. That is, its only content pertains to ~o:w I ought to act, h?w
free action is possible, and what the condItIOns are under w.h~ch
obedience is attainable. Religion, Kant says, is "the recogmtion
of all duties as divine commands, ... as essential laws of any free
will as such."20 We turn next, then, to Kant's development of
religion by practical reason and the position and possibility of
revelation.
THE POSSIBILITY AND VALUE OF REVELATION

In Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone Kant works out his
natural theology. That is, practical reason i~ allowed to fully
work out its postulates in r~lati?r:- to t?e major the~es of rehgious knowledge. The work IS dIVI?ed mto fo~r sectIOns: In. the
first section Kant explores the subject of man s natural mclmation to evil. In section 2 he discusses the conflict between good
and evil and the nature of salvation. Section 3 is concerned with
the nature of true religion and especially the contrast between
rational and revealed systems. It is this part that occupies most
of our attention as we discuss directly the possibility of revelation. The final section provides the meaning of service and the
general mode of life under a rational religion.

On the Radical Evil in Human Nature
Is man innately good or evil? Kant's answer to this question is
two-sided. On the one hand he holds that there is no reason to
think that any of man's original predispositio~~ are aimed i~ ~ny
other direction than toward the good. Kant dIVIdes these ongmal
predispositions into animal (preservation, sex, com~unity),
human (equality), and personal (respect for law, conSCIOusness
of law). On the level of these natural instincts man is directed
toward the moral law.
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On the other hand Kant considers it obvious that man's will is
inclined toward evil. In fact, he offers no argument for the position; it is self-evident.
How, then, is this propensity to evil to be explained? What is
corrupt is not man as man, but the "subjective ground" of his
will. 21 That is, the maxims or rational principles of choice are no
longer pure. Man is still conscious of the moral law, however,
and thus practical reason as such is not destroyed. Evil has
become, as Kant says, subjectively necessary. It is not innate to
the species.
What accounts for the origin of subjective evil? Kant's response to this problem is vague at best, and at this point we
begin to see the difficulties with his rational and nonhistorical, or
even antihistorical, religion. Since evil's origin is not related to
the species, it cannot have a single, temporal nature. Kant says
that historical accounts such as that in Scripture have a moral use
in helping us understand the nature of a subjective change; but if
the change is, in fact, related to the will, then its event is not
phenomenal-that is, having historically identifiable causesbut rather noumenal. Thus Kant adds in a footnote to this discussion that the "historical knowledge which has no inner bearing valid for all men belongs to the class of adiaphora, which each
man is free to hold as he finds edifying." 22 He even tells us that
as far as our ordinary awareness is concerned, each evil act is to
be viewed as directly and individually a fall from innocence. 23
If a temporal explanation fails, then what explanation will do?
Evil must have originated in a rational act of will to incorporate
improper maxims into-that is, alongside of-the categorical
moral law, which it continues to know. Kant's difficulty at this
point is that the rational origin of evil maxims is inscrutable. 24
Evil acts can come only from an evil will, but there is nothing
that might explain the subjective choice of an evil maxim of will
on the part of a good individual. How should a good man with a
good will come to act out of selfishness or cruelty?
Nevertheless, Kant is convinced of the radical evil of man,
though man remains accountable because he remains rational
and free. We are always able to do what we ought to dO. 25 This
leaves Kant in a second difficulty. Just as the initiation of discordant maxims is inscrutable yet obvious, so also the condition of
an evil will is irreversible yet restorable. It is irreversible for the
same reason that its origin is incomprehensible: it is noumenal,
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not phenomenal, and there is no cause that can explain the
reversing of the will, understood as practical reason.
Much of Kant's predicament here results from identifYing the
will with reason in its practical function, and from placing the
will in the noumenal realm. There can be neither causes nor
independent reasons for choices of maxims, except for the moral
law itself. The universal law is the only maxim that conforms to
freedom and it is, therefore, a reflection of man's true autonomous nature. To obey it is thus the only choice conceivable for
the rational will. Yet it is just this radical autonomy that makes
possible the rejection of the freedom to be good. There remains
no explanation for the adoption of irrational and evil maxims,
nor for the return to rational functions-except that man is free
to do so.
Man himself must make or have made himself into whatever, in a
moral sense, whether good or evil, he is or is to become. Either
condition must be an effect of his free choice; for otherwise he
could not be' held responsible for it and could therefore be morally
neither good nor evil. 26
Salvation must also share this noumenal nature. It must be
possible to return to purity of maxim, but we cannot understand
how. It must be possible because duty demands it, not because
revelation tells us. Salvation, Kant says, consists of a simple, yet
radical change of will, even though the actual change in a man's
life is gradual. Nevertheless from God's viewpoint (that of timeless reason), regeneration and sanctification, to use more traditional theological language, are a simple unity.
What role does God play in salvation? We again face a dual
answer. From the point of view of rational freedom any work of
grace or divine assistance is contradictory in Kant's system.
For the employment of this idea would presuppose a rule concerning the good which (for a particular end) we ourselves must
do in order to accomplish something, whereas to await a work of
grace means exactly the opposite, namely, that the good (the
morally good) is not our deed but the deed of another being, and
that we therefore can achzeve it only by doing nothing, which contradicts itself.27
Theoretically, then, Kant considers grace a useless concept. A
free will must correct its own principles of choice Nevertheless,
Kant knows that this is impossible:
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But does not this restoration through one's Own exertion c\itectly
contradict the postulate of the innate corruption of man wnicn
unfits him for all good? Yes, to be sure, as far as the conceivability, z.e., our znszght into the possibility, of such a restoration is
concerned. 28
Faced with these difficulties, Kant concludes that while we
cannot adopt the notion of a work of grace into our maxims of
reason, we do know that much is beyond our comprehension and
we can, therefore, choose to accept it by rifiectwe faith. 29

Concerning the Conflict of the Good With the Evil Principle
for Sovereignty Over Man
In the second section of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone
Kant deals with the actual nature of salvation. The first section
begins to give, however indirectly, a picture of Kant's view ofthe
function of revelation. It is clear that individual autonomous
reason, functioning "practically" in relation to. the moral law,
must be the ultimate source of knowledge. ThIS now becomes
much clearer, particularly in Kant's dis~uss~on of the ro.le of
Christ in salvation. Kant has already dIsmIssed the ratIOnal
function of a redemptive act of grace, but what about the revelational role of Christ? While Kant deals with other problems as
well in this section, it is this topic to which he repeatedly returns.
In the course of section 2 Kant offers at least five reasons why
revelation-in the form of a model-is unnecessary. The first is
perhaps the most obvious. There is nothing to be k~own from
revelation that practical reason cannot postulate by Itself. (We
must remember that practical reason, strictly speaking, does not
know.) What is required of man, why it is require?, ~h~t he can
perform it-all of this is already present to each mdlvldu~l.
The second reason follows from the first. If man alreaay has
what he needs then the search for an example or any sort of
verification is precisely an act of unfaith, not faith. The very act
of believing in Christ rather than relying on free autonomous
practical reason is an act of dis.b~lief.
Third, Kant argues that a hvmg example, known only as a
phenomenon, could nev~r disclose ~hat is really necessary,
namely, the purity of maXIms of the w~ll. The latter IS of course a
noumenal act of reason. Kant states It thus:
According to the law, each man ought really to furnish an example of this idea in his own person; to this end does the archetype
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reside always in the reason: and this, just because no example in
outer experience is adequate to it; for outer experience does not
disclose the inner nature of the disposition but merely allows of an
inference about it though not one of strict certainty.30

identical to the will of God. Scripture'S language is "figurative,"35 or "vivid,"36 or pictoria1. 37 For example, Kant says the
following concerning Scripture's use of "evil spirits" to signify
the enemies of the archetype:

Fourth, if any man can achieve purity of maxims, then Christ,
even if it could be proved that his origin was supernatural, can
be of no benefit to us. There is nothing Christ could reveal to us
by way of example that is not already understandable by the
natural man.
Finally, Kant argues that it is already difficult enough to follow the moral law known to us. It only makes matters worse to
bring in an outside example. Kant argues in the following way:
And the presence of this archetype in the human soul is in itself
sufficiently incomprehensible without our adding to its supernatural origin the assumption that is hypostasized in a particular
individual. The elevation of such a holy person above all the
frailties of human nature would rather, as far as we can·see, hinder
the adoption of the idea of such a person for our imitation. 31

This is an expression which seems to have been used not to extend
our knowledge beyond the world of sense but only to make clear
jar practical use the conception of what is for us unfathomable. 38

Salvation, then, is found in reason, in conformity to the
archetype known to the mind.
Now it is our universal duty as men to elevate ourselves to this ideal
of moral perfection, that is, to this archetype of the moral disposition in all its purity-and for this the idea itself, which reason
presents to us for our zealous emulation, can give us power. 32
Kant does have a high regard, however, for the person of
Christ. At one point he even affirms that we find salvation
through a ''practical faith in this Son of God. "33 Kant makes one
suggestion as to how the archetype known to reason can also be
faith in the Son of God. The mind itself, he says, cannot be the
source ofthe moral law as a universal and necessary ideal. It can
only "come down to us from heaven"34 and is thus a "humiliation."
Kant's ethical religion, then, as shown in the reasons given
above does not find itself in need of revelation in the sense of a
historical model. While Kant acknowledges and respects the historical Christ, the statements of Scripture that refer to Christ are
to be understood existentially, to use a contemporary term. That
is, the christological statements are to be understood as statements about my self. The revelation of the ideal man in Christ i~,
in fact, the rational apprehension by man's reason that duty IS

Another example of Kant's use of Scripture can be seen in his
examination of the concept of sacrifice as necessary for payment
of debt. Kant can say that it is the archetype that bears the
penalty for sin. What that means, however, is roughly the following existential translation. 39 The sacrifice is the giving up of
selfish maxims by the rational will. It constitutes ''punishments
whereby satisfaction is rendered to divine justice."40 In fact,
each man must do this for himself.
We turn next to Kant's remarks directly concerning revelation. This involves us in the question of the actual nature of
religion.

The Victory of the Good Over the Evil Principle,
and the Founding of a Kingdom of God on Earth
In section 3 Kant is concerned to show how a universal religion is possible. That is, how can all individuals be brought to
recognize the need to adopt a purity of maxim? The answer is
simply that revelation cannot achieve this recognition, while rational faith can-and has done so. We must seek the truth within
us, not in an external revelation. Kant allows for revelation only
in a subservient sense. It may show what "has hitherto remained
hidden from men through their own fault."41 I count in this
section thirteen reasons why rational faith is superior to revelation. This section, then, applies Kant's epistemology to revelation and clarifies revelation's status in relation to religion.
1. Rationalfaith is ethical. As we have seen, Kant concludes that
religion is ethical in nature. Its tenets are postulates of practical
reason. Thus the purpose of revelation, says Kant, can only be to
serve practical reason. The principle of biblical exegesis shifts in
Kant from Luther's explicit christo centrism to ethicocentrism:
What does the Bible tell me to do?42 Clearly, rational faith is
superior, since it admits of direct cognizance of the moral law.
Revelation is indirect at best.
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2. Rationalfaith is necessary. The religion of practical reason is a
necessary postulate. It must be true if we are to make sense of our
knowledge of moral law. Revelational propositions merely are
true.
Revelation would have to be verified by reason to be of any
use. This would have to occur in one of two ways. Eithe~ reaso?
directly determines the truth of the propositions of revelatlOn o~ It
verifies the source of that revelation. In the former case revelatlOn
is of course, uselessly repetitive. It is necessarily true, but only
b~cause of its verification, line by line, by reason. In the la~ter
case revelation may provide us with additional informatIOn
hith~rto undiscovered by reason. However, it cannot be kno,:,",n
with necessity. Any verification of source, Kant says, must mvolve historical or factual considerations. 43 As a result, our
knowledge will be a posteriori and contingen~, not nece~sary.
3. Rationalfaith is universal. The problem WIth revelatlO~ as a
means of providing man with information on how to act 1~, a<:cording to Kant, that it can never reach every.one .. Rev:l~tIOn IS
empirical in nature and thus bO';lnd.e~ by social, l~ngUlstIc, and
practical conditions. As a result, mdIVI?Ual revelatIOn. can be the
source only oflocalized, dogmatizedfazths, not the umversal true
religion.
Pure religious faith alone can found a universal church; for only
[such] rational faith can be believed in and shared by everyone,
whereas an historical faith, grounded solely on facts, can ~xtend
its influence no further than tidings of it can reach, subJect. to
circumstances of time and place and dependent upon the capacIty
44
[of men] to judge the credibility of such tidings.

4. Ratzonal faith is prior. Any revelation, Kant argues,. is immediately posterior to reason in that it ~ust first be ven?ed or
authenticated by reason. 45 Reason must mterpret revelat.IOn ..
Kant is forced to deny any notion of a self-authentlcatmg
knowledge of revelation. There ~s no kno"."~edge without ~~e operation of pure reason. All else ~s supers~l~lOn. In the Cntzque of
Judgment Kant explains that ratIOnal rehgIOn prevents theology
from becoming theosophy (the use of transcendental concepts
above reason) and it prevents religion from becoming theurgy
(the belief in feeling or ~irect ~o~tact with the supernatural).46
The general epistemologIcal prmciple cannot be broken, even for
a supposed divine revelation.
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5. Rationalfaith is an act offree will. It is thus not only ethically
prior, but also ontologically prior, to revelation. 47 Revelation
may assist the less thoughtful, but any faith that relies on it
denies the nature of man.
Revelation can produce only an ecclesiastical faith. It cannot,
by itself, give a person true understanding of what is required of
him. It can tell him, but this is always for Kant an external
source of knowledge. Thus it indicates a reliance of the will on
heteronomous sources. This is, of course, a denial of man's autonomous freedom.
Of all of Kant's reasons, it seems to me that this one strikes at
the heart of what is important to him. Whereas the others indicate mostly epistemological inferiorities of revelation, this reason
concerns the very being of man. Rousseau's influence on Kant is
quite apparent here. But it is also true that Kant's doctrine of
freedom is firmly grounded in his epistemology. Nothing can be
known without the operation of pure reason. Nothing can be
postulated without the uncaused adoption of practical reason.
6. Rationalfaith is self-promoting. Closely connected to the above
is revelation's dependence on a "learned public" that is related
to the origin of the revelation by a tradition ofscholarship.48 In a
sense, revelational faith is thus elitist. It cannot continue without
highly skilled exegetes and theologians who verify and interpret
the revelation to the common man. Rational faith needs no such
assistance. It promotes itself. Every person is capable of full
comprehension of the dictates of practical reason.
7. Rational faith is an end. Ecclesiastical or revelational faith,
because it is not fully rational, can only be a means to an end and
not an end in itself.49 It serves as a vehicle for rational faith but it
can never function as a goal. Rational faith embodies the fulfillment of human existence. Man's ultimate goal is found in free
moral conformity to the categorical imperative.
8. Rational faith is complete. A truly saving faith must accomplish two purposes, Kant holds. 50 It must first provide "atonement"; that is, it must undo sin and return a person to purity of
maxim. Second, it must provide morality. It must give a person a
new life and tell him how to live.
The atonement of revelation is incomplete. It does not tell a
person how to live a new life but tells him simply that he is
forgiven without first improving his life. No thoughtful person
can bring himself to believe this. The best proof of this, says
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Kant, is that ifit were true then surely people would universally
respond. This is clearly not the case, but Kant is certain that
universal response would be so for the ethical religion of reason.
9. Rational faith is productive. Revelational faith, and Kant includes Christian revelation here, is not universally effective in
changing men's lives. 51 Some will choose to obey it-and even
that is, of course, a decision for heteronomy-but many will not
alter their conduct. Rational faith, however, never fails. Recognition of the moral law always converts the free will that sees there
the fulfillment of its being.
10. Rational faith is private. Revelation produces actual, local
ecclesiastical faiths. These are external and public congregations. Rational faith, at least until the goal of universality is
achieved, "has no public status."52 It is purely an inner change,
an invisibly developing church.
11. Rational faith is ultzmate. Kant's theology is specifically
goal-oriented. The title of one of his shorter works is translated
Perpetual Peace (1795). The German title is Zum ewigen Frieden,
that is literally, To Eternal Peace. Kant outlines here how his
ethical religion works itself out in political policies. He is convinced in the Religzon that the religion of reason will lead to
universal peace and harmony. Revelational faiths may accomplish limited peace. The ultimate stage of human history, however, will not be ushered in until rational faith has become universa1. 53 Ultimacy is thus tied to universality.
12. Rationalfaith is permanent. Since rational faith will usher in
the ultimate end of history, and since a will with pure maxims
cannot corrupt itself, the results of such faith are permanent.
Reason's victory is eterna1. 54
13. Rational faith is identical with revelational faith. After all that
has been said, this final point may seem contradictory. Kant's
point, however, is important to the question of merrant revelation. Kant seems always to assume that despite all of the inferiorities of revelation, ifit could, in fact, be shown to be authentically divine in origin-by prior reason-that would constitute
proof of its truthfulness.
We have already seen, however, that Kant interprets the nature of truthfulness in a moral or existential rather than a descriptive and historical sense. Thus a literal sense of inerrancy
cannot apply in Kant's view of revelation. Genuine revelation
must be identical in content to purely rational faith. In both the
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content is the archetype of human conduct, "lying in our reason,
that we attribute to [Christ] (since, so far as his example can be
known, he is found to conform thereto)."55
When we, then, properly understand a verified revelation, its
content will coincide with the product of reason alone. This is the
proper function of religion. Kant says, "It concerns us not so
much to know what God is in Himself (His nature) as what He is
for us as moral beings (emphasis added)."56

Concerning Service and Pseudo-Service Under the Sovereignty
of the Good Principle
While Kant's stated subject in this section deals with the
organizational aspects of religion, the section serves also as a
summary statement on the relationship between reason and
revelation. I am commenting on it here for just that purpose.
Kant's position on revelation begins, of course, with his epistemology, which requires that religion in general be ethical in
content. Religion is simply the understanding of the moral imperative, no longer abstractly, but as God's will. As Kant
phrases it, religion is "the recognition of all duties as divine
commands." 57
Since religion is concerned only with individual behavior (it is in
that sense existential), it is not the imparting of true propositions
either of fact or metaphysics.
As regards the theoretical apprehension and avowal of belief, no
assertorial knowledge is required (even of God's existence), since,
with our lack of insight into supersensible objects such avowal
might well be dissembled; rather it is merely a problematical assumption (hypothesis) regarding the highest cause of things that
is presupposed speculatively .... The minimum of knowledge (it is
possible that there may be a God) must suffice, subjectively, for
whatever can be made the duty of every man. 58

Religion, however, is not simply a list of particular duties and
services. It would then offend man's autonomy. Religion is simply the recognition that duty, apprehended in the moral law, is
related to God as postulated by practical reason.
Religion, so defined, must rest on universal human reason.
Any revelation will lead to an individual and local church because of its empirical character. It cannot command unconditional allegiance because its authenticity and authority must first
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be determined by reason. Kant says this of revelation's claim to
authority:
Since assu~anc~ on this s~ore rests on no grounds of proof other
than the hIstorIcal, and smce there ever will remain in the judgment of the people ... the absolute possibility of an error which
has ~rept in thr~ugh their interpretation or through previous
classIcal exegesIs, the cle;gyman would De requiring the
people ... to confess somethmg to be as true as is their belief in

God .... 59
?ur belief in God rests on a postulate of practical reason. Belief
m the truth of revelation could never be more than possible and
cor;tt~ngen~. Thus Kant warns us of the problem when we "seek
rehgIOn wIthout and not within US."60
EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE
Ther~ can be little doubt. that .Kant's epistemology figures
largely m t?e cor:temporary dISc~ssion concerning the possibility
and actual~t! of merrant revelatIOn. Many of the characteristics
of the pOSitIOns of those who deny authoritative and inerrant
re~elation are drawn directly from Kant. In many cases the
rehance on Kant is explicit and admitted. And, while it is true
th~t some ele~ents of this position are prior to Kant, it seems
eVIdent that It was Kant who first put them into a coherent
whole and introduced them into the mainstream of Christian
(particularly German) theology. From Kant the line of influence
is not difficult to trace through Schleiermacher to nineteenthcentury liberalism, and then to contemporary neoliberalism.
S~h~bert Ogden, p:rhaps the most prominent interpreter and
cntic of Bultmann m the late 1950s, is the spokesman of those
wh~ are currently working out a "process" theology, following
WhItehead and Hartshorne, on top of an existential epistemology.61 I will use Ogden as a source throughout the Evaluation
and Critique.

The Value of a Revelation
. "':e will examine two aspects of Kant's philosophy that show
hIS mfluence: first, the bifurcation in Kant's epistemology between facts and values and the effect of that bifurcation on arguments for the existence of God and on the value of an inerrant
revelation; second, the view of salvation and human nature and
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Kant's emphasis on choice-the free act of the will-and the
implications of that view for the necessity of revelation.
The bifurcation between facts and values shows itself in Kant
as the two functions of pure and practical reason. While contemporary theologians may use different terminology, the result is
the same: the source of science is different from the source of
values. There is a difference not only in source, and thus in the
mode of verification, but also in status. Facts are known; values
are not, even though they are considered important. This bifurcation is clearly seen in the many variations of existential
theological epistemologies as the distinction between "objective"
knowledge known by the senses and "existential" awareness.
(The latter is the direct, intuitive confrontation with the inner
self and its possibility of authentic existence.)
The existence of God is included in the list of what ought to be,
not of what, in fact, is. This goes hand in hand with the summary
rejection of the arguments for God's existence. In existential
theology this becomes the denial of God as "an object among
objects." Ogden's only argument, if that is the correct term, for
God's reality is a strictly moral one, similar to Kant's. God must
exist, says Ogden, or else our trust in the value and meaning of
life makes no sense. 62 There is no argument based on the objective data but only on the demands of existentialist awareness.
Kant's position and influence are curiously two-sided at this
point. There is, on the one hand, no denying the fact that Kant
believed there is a God and that Kant was pious and religious, at
least in an ethical sense. Kant is clearly not intentionally a
naturalist. On the other hand, Kant's position leads to a rejection of supernaturalism as a rational option. God's existence cannot be known, only postulated. Following Kant there have been,
not surprisingly, a series of non cognitive, subjective or practical
attempts to justify belief. Feeling, experience, encounter, precognitive choices of categories or language games, and many
other options have been suggested. They all agree on one thing:
they concede with Kant's agnosticism that a truly rational approach is impossible. The specific objections that Kant raised to
the theistic arguments have long been countered from many
quarters. Nevertheless, the opinion that the arguments are unreliable and that religion is nonrational has continued as the
majority view, frequently even among conservative theologians
and evangelicals in philosophy.

74

BIBLICAL ERRANCY

This influence of Kant seems to me to be one of the primary
factors that have led many contemporary theologians to deny the
real value of an inerrant revelation. If the truly important matters oflife, such as God and the possibility of authentic existence,
are not to be known by ordinary knowledge, then they will not be
known by propositional communication, particularly not that of
historical events. The language of facts is well suited for science
and ordinary activities, but it will not do for the inner and the
subjective. Thus any revelation in objective language, the Bible
in particular, must be, to use the contemporary term, "demythologized" and interpreted existentially. Kant did not use
this vocabulary, but his position is substantially the same: the
pictorial language of Scripture must be translated into moral
language.
This Kantian view of revelation is one of the main ingredients
in what was to become the German "higher criticism" movement. There had already been many Enlightenment thinkers
who had dismissed the miraculous elements of Scripture
wholesale. Johann Semler (1725-1791) appears to have been the
first to advocate the individual consideration, from a critical
literary and historical standpoint, of the separate books of the
Bible. Kant's contribution to this movement, as we have seen, is
the criterion for translating Scripture into a useful contemporary
reading and seeking for its moral function. In this operation
practical reason remains, of course, the authority.
Kant's influence has clearly extended also to the view of salvation. Since revelation is, at best, an aid to slow and lessdeveloped minds, salvation becomes the dual process of recognition and self-change. For Kant, this recognition is of one's
failure to live in true freedom (autonomy) as God intends.
For Ogden, and like-minded theologians, this recognition is that
we are not maximizing the potential for authentic existence
exemplified in Christ. Increasingly, this authenticity is interpreted as freedom. Such has always been true of existential
theologians, Bultmann in particular, but in Ogden such an interpretation is now more explicit because of the influence of
liberation theology. 63
Self-change is the other aspect of the process of salvation. This
is the deliberate, free, and understanding act of the will. In Kant
it is the choice toward purity of maxims. This is simply to say
that the possibility of freedom is open when it is recognized. I

AGNOSTICISM KANT

75

can change my behavior toward freedom if only I know I can.
The identical transition can be found in contemporary followers
of Kant. There is no need for redemptive atonement, certainly
not for propitiation. There is no just and holy God. Freedom,
and thus authenticity, is there for the choosing.
Furthermore, this salvation is not only possible but, in some
sense, partially present. For Kant, the recognition may need
some prodding from revelation. For Ogden, too, it is helpful to
have a historical example. But in neither view can revelation be
necessary. It is a rational postulate that all men must make in
order to make sense of their moral experience. Ogden refers to
this recognition as "original revelation" given to all men. Nothing additional could or need be said. 64 For Kant, of course,
anything more would be illusory.
The convergence of the characteristics of Kant's position and
of those who deny authoritative, inerrant revelation, results from
a root identity, namely, in epistemology. I shall simply trace the
logic of Kant's position, reversing in the following section the
order of the logic of the system and moving toward its starting
point.

Kant and Inerrancy
The conclusion of Kant's system is a curious mixture. Kant
never denies the possibility of revelation, yet his epistemology
precludes its authoritative nature. If the revelation comes in the
form of visual or audible data, then it is known only by rational
judgment. If it is some form of direct intuition or dictation, then
it cannot be known-unless judged to be true by an independent
reason. In either case, the possibility of an inerrant revelation
appears to be precluded. There can be no inspired source that is
epistemologically authoritative for man. Revelation can be
meaningful only as a sample of moral behavior.
A parallel conclusion is the lack of necessity that pertains to
the atonement of Christ. For Kant Christ is an example. For
Ogden he is an objectification of human potential. In neither
case is there any redemptive value, and even the revelational
value is contingent.
All of the conclusions regarding the function of revelation follow from the Kantian principle that a person can do what he
ought to do. In other words, man, despite the radical evil in him,
is still capable of pure ethical action. While Kant's (and Og-
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den's) epistemology explains the nonnecessity o~t.he atonement,
it is this position of the inherent goodness and abIlIty of man that
really implies it.
..
,
Again, however, we must ask for the final ~asis ~n Kant s
system from which his view of revelation and hIS ethICS result.
The answer I think, is found in his doctrine of the autonomy of
reason. The' first sentence of the preface to the first edition of the
Religion is this:
So far as morality is based upon the conception of man as a free
agent who, just because he is free, binds himse~f through ~is reason to unconditioned laws, it stands in need neIther of the Idea of
another Being over him, for him to apprehend his duty, nor of an
incentive other than the law itself, for him to do his duty.65

Thus, while religious man recognizes the connection between
duty and the will of God, reason itself, whereby he makes that
judgment and determines his action, is wholly free. E~en knowledge of the sensible universe depends on the operatIOn of that
reason. The autonomy of reason is, then, related to the split
between reality and appearance, between the noumenal world
.
itself and the phenomenal world that I know.
It is not surprising then that contemporary theo~oglan~ cannot
accept an authoritative, inerrant Scripture. Kantlan eplsten:ology still reigns. Ogden, for example, goes so far as to say thIS:
Kant's philosophy has come to have unofficially something like
the same status among Protestants as Thomas' has long had
among Roman Catholics-and this for the .very good reas~m that
Kant's distinction between man's theoretIcal and practIcal rationality made possible a salvage operation typical of m?dern
Protestantism and comparable in significance to that prevlOusly
carried out by Thomas in distinguishing between reason and
faith.66

It is clear, then, that any theology that accepts inerrancy and
authority must construct an alternative epistemology. to K~~t's.
To do so will involve destroying two key tenets of hIS pOSItIOn.
The first is the atomic, sensationist theory of empirical data; that
is that there are isolated and purely physical impulses detected
b~ the body without order or meaning apart from th: function of
reason and thus that reason and the senses are entIrely separable in ~peration. The second,and clos~ly ,~elated, tenet. is Kant's
principle (the "transcendental deductlOn ) that what IS pres up-
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posed by. our understanding. of the data cannot be part of, or
mcluded m, the data. Thus tIme, space, oneness, causality, and
so on, are part of the mind's functioning, not of the data.
Tr~ditionally~ attempts to refute the Kantian epistemology
have mvol:ved eIther some version of realism (that is, that we in
some speCIfied sense know the real world), or idealism (that is,
that knowledge is of ideas whose source, in some versions of
idealism, is God). Kant himself attempted to refute idealism in
his first Critique by demonstrating the "emptiness" of rational
concepts apart from externally derived content. His arguments
are, I think, successful. If they are valid, then it may well be that
a commitment to the inerrant authority of Scripture rests on a
defen~e and ~ontinued refinement of a realist epistemology.
ThIS essay IS not the place to attempt any positive construction
of an epistemology. It must suffice to point out that neither of
Kant's. tenets is necessary. The first, that of atomic impressions,
he denved from Hume. It is the cornerstone of the Enlightenment model of perception, shared both by rationalists such as
Descartes and Leibniz and by empiricists such as Locke and
Be:keley. While t?es~ p~ilosophers, as well as many subsequent
phIlosophers contmumg mto the present, disagree as to the value
of impressions, they all agree that those impressions are atomic.
~hat is, in their primitive state as apprehended, they are indiVIdual sounds, colors, tactile impressions, and so on.
It is not,
. however,
. either obvious or clear that we see ' hear,
and feel ImpreSSIOns rather than reality67 or individual data
rather than a total environment. 68 Choosing the model of atomic
data leaves the extremely difficult problem of explaining how
and with what authority the mind coordinates these bits and
pieces and interprets the results. There is an alternate model,
that is, that we apprehend directly a segment of the real world.
This model leaves some serious problems as well, but they are
not insurmountable. The typical arguments for the atomic model
can be countered. 69 We can thus avoid the skepticism about the
noumenal world that plagues Humean and Kantian epistemologies.
Kant's second epistemological tenet is similarly susceptible to
criticism. A. N. Whitehead has argued that Kant's attempt to
base objectivity on subjectivity is "thoroughly topsy-turvy."70
One does not have to agree with Whitehead's own position to see
the cogency of his rejection of Kant's. Because Kant's model of
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awareness is that of the passive reception of impressions , he must
conclude that anything beyond the simple "thereness" of impressions is an active contribution of mind. This necessity falls,
however, if we reject Kant's model of atomic impressions and
allow for a fully personal interaction with a total environment.
But, again, I am not concerned to demonstrate an alternative,
only to show that Kant's whole position depends on his epistemology, which itself depends on some debatable assumptions.71
The task of constructing an epistemology is extremely crucial.
The availability of supernaturalism as a fully rational option,
and an inerrant revelation as even viable, let alone factual, hangs
in the balance. If Ogden is correct in his assessment of Kant's
present influence, and I think he is, it is not surprising that the
doctrine of a supernaturally given Scripture, authoritative and
inerrant, is held by most of our contemporaries to be not only
false, but incomprehensible.
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